As the rhetoric has heated up and North Korea has launched missile test after missile test, it has become obvious to even the most obtuse that there is no way that North Korea is going to give up its nuclear weapons peacefully. While this has been obvious for years, diplomats have been pretending (and hoping) that somehow, in spite of everything, North Korea could be talked out of its nuclear weapons program. This was always going to be unlikely given the last 20 years of world history which has taught dictators that those with nuclear weapons survive and those without might not. However, now that the North is coming closer to a ballistic missile that could possibly carry a nuke to the U.S. mainland, kicking the can down the road and hoping for a diplomatic miracle doesn’t seem to be a viable option any longer. While a military intervention is going to create major geopolitical, economic, and social havoc, allowing the North the capacity to threaten the U.S. with nuclear blackmail constantly is simply not something the U.S. can countenance.
So to that end, what sort of military pressure can the U.S. bring to bear to topple the regime and end the threat.
The Battlefield:
The first things to recognize is that apart from its missiles, the only major threat to major population centers that the North possesses is its artillery, which in some cases is only 35 to 40 miles away from the capital, Seoul. Neutralizing this threat in the first hours of the conflict would need to be a major priority. But even so, despite predictions from people who don’t know what they are talking about, North Korean artillery would not be able to flatten Seoul. So, taking these threats into consideration, how would a military attack on and destruction of the North Korean regime actually play out?
The Start:
The first thing is that the war needs to start suddenly and without warning. Although starting by launching cruise missiles at a military parade in broad daylight would have the advantage of likely taking out Kim Jong Un and much of his military brass in one fell swoop, the war should be started at night with soldiers in their beds. The artillery positions nearest Seoul, as well as missile launch sites, need to be saturated with high explosives within the first minutes, and to the extent possible, rendered inoperable. Furthermore, cruise missiles should be launch at critical infrastructure (bridges, electricity grids, radar facilities, roadways, military airfields, civilian airfields, etc.) to disrupt movement, and if possible, jam cell phone signals and radio communications. Especially airbases need to be rendered inoperable by cratering the runway making them unusable and by destroying as many planes on the ground as possible. In short, the North Korean air force needs to cease to exist quickly.
The Next Step:
A military build-up on the Korean Peninsula would be noticed and allow the North Koreans to prepare for war. This makes the next step tricky, because you don’t want them mobilized for war when the attack happens. A well-noticed build-up would allow us to have everything we need in place thereby making the invasion more effective and the ultimate outcome all but assured. However, it would allow North Korea time to marshal its forces and calibrate its missile and artillery to meet the coming invasion and to inflict as much damage (including nuclear damage) as possible by a regime who is dying anyway. They might even be provoked to try and launch a preemptive invasion of the South to try and take over the South before we had enough forces built up in the area.
Consequently, the best option would be to launch a sudden, amphibious 1944 France-style invasion along the western coast of North Korea. The objective would be to try and cut off Pyongyang from the rest of the country. Encircling Pyongyang and cutting off communications with the outside world to the extent possible can hamper the ability of the regime to direct the battle. Faced with losing everything, the regime could disintegrate and take out the dictator on their own. In any case, being cut off from the chain of command means that the army will find it difficult to conduct any sort of operations beyond a local static defense. A society like North Korea where one wrong decision can mean the end of your life has very likely created an army not used to taking initiative. In a fast-moving battle, they simply won’t be able to react quickly to changing circumstances.
In any case, an immediate threat to Pyongyang could, to the extent that the North Korean army was still capable of launching offensive operations, force them to turn their attention to combating the threat to their own capital as opposed to launching an invasion of the South. While much is made of the 1 million man North Korean army (roughly 2/3’s of which is located near the frontline De-Militarized Zone (DMZ)), South Korea has a 500,000 man army itself. Its equipment is superior to North Korea and it would likely be able to effectively defend South Korea from any attempted invasion from the North.
Actual Ground Invasion:
In fact, the South Korean military would likely be called upon to conduct an invasion of the North relatively shortly after the start of hostilities to push the North Koreans back from Seoul. The South Korean forces would likely be more flexible and able to conduct fast-moving offensive operations. While the going would be tougher as the Korean terrain doesn’t lend itself easily to fast moving armored formations (like the deserts of Iraq), the complete control of the air that the U.S. will have achieved means that moving north will be much easier than the terrain would likely otherwise allow. In addition, South Korean logistics systems will be largely intact thereby furthering advance.
During this time, psych-ops such as dropping leaflets and transmitting other messages to North Koreans urging them to surrender should be done. Having plenty of food on hand and logistics systems in place to handle these prisoners will be key.
Nuclear Facilities & Mobile Missile Launchers:
The largest difficulty with any of this is the fact that the nuclear facilities are largely in the northern part of the country and difficult to get to. These facilities will have to have their own section dedicated to neutralizing them. The launch sites can be obliterate, even perhaps by using our own tactical nukes, although I don’t think we would have to go that far. But air assets would need to be standing by for the duration of the war to make sure none of these missiles left their launching pads.
The bigger challenge would be the mobile missile launchers. Tracking these down and destroying them would be a job for the special forces. In Iraq in 1991, special forces teams had some success in tracking down and destroying mobile Scud missile launchers that Saddam was using to attack Israel. But he was also able to get off some launches as well. Given that some of these mobile launchers could have a nuke on it, the detection and elimination of these is of paramount importance.
The Likely Result:
Although much is being made of how large the North Korean army is, the simple fact is that militarily it simply would not be able to stand-up to overwhelming military assets that the U.S. along with South Korea would be able to bring to bear. I suspect that within 72 hours to 168 hours (3 to 7 days), the North Korean military would cease to function as a coherent fighting force. The country has been living off its glory from a war that was fought 65 years ago. And even then, North Korea was effectively beaten but was bailed out by the Chinese at a time when the U.S. and opposing militaries (Chinese and Soviets) were more evenly matched. There won’t be a Chinese army crashing across the Yalu River to push the Americans back to the 38th Parallel and prop up the North Korean regime this time.
Furthermore, even putting up some sort of token military or guerilla resistance assumes that the population has a belief in the government or system on whose behalf it is fighting. In addition, in order to function in a fast moving battle space requires that junior officers be able to take initiative to changing conditions on the ground. The simple fact that taking initiative in North Korea is a good way to get yourself killed by the regime means that North Korean society simply isn’t one that is going to produce a military capable of operating flexibly in battle outside of approved channels. With much (if not all) of the communication channels (and possibly leadership) disrupted or eliminated within the first hours, the ability of the North to mount any kind of defense will be seriously curtailed.
The unknown piece is whether North Korea will be able to get off a shot with its nukes. That is the major risk in this operation.
The Aftermath:
The aftermath of a conquered North Korea would be difficult to predict. A country that has been abused, brainwashed, and malnourished for 3 generations leaves nobody who would even know how to operate in the modern world with a modern economy. The effects of the last 70 years will still be seen 100 years from now. Initially, the fortified border would need to be maintained to avoid having North Koreans streaming to the South. A new North Korean government would have to be set up to maintain order, under the auspices of the U.S. and South Korea. With a breakdown in the distribution system, famine might be wide spread. We really don’t know.
Whatever happens, it would certainly be a complete mess. But with the regime in the North being what it is and having access to the weapons that it has, leaving the status quo is looking like less of a viable option.